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Online Appendix
This Online Appendix is divided into three parts. Appendix A proves results in the
main text. Appendix B is a complete treatment of the general model (which allows each
entrepreneur to value the quality of her opponent’s policies at (1   ) q i) and proves Lemma
1, which contains necessary conditions for equilibrium. Appendix C is a complete treatment
of the variant with dogmatic entrepreneurs, and proves Lemma 2 which contains necessary
conditions for equilibrium in that variant.
1
A Main Proofs
We first transform strategies (y, q) to be expressed in terms of score and ideology. An en-
trepreneur’s pure strategy (si, yi) is a two-dimensional element of B ⌘ {(s, y) 2 R2 | s+ y2   0},
or the set of scores and ideologies that imply positive-quality policies. A mixed strategy  i
is a probability measure over the Borel subsets of B, and let Fi (s) denote the CDF over
scores induced by i’s mixed strategy  i. For technical convenience we restrict attention to
strategies generating score CDFs that can be written as the sum of an absolutely continu-
ous and a discrete distribution. The decisionmaker is the last mover, so equilibrium requires
that he choose a policy (s, y) with the maximum score. While a complete description also
requires specifying his tie-breaking rules, equilibria are invariant to this decision so we omit
the additional notation.
In Appendix B we prove the following properties of equilibrium for both the baseline model,
and the variant in which each entrepreneur values the quality of her opponent’s policies at
(1   ) q i.
Lemma 1. The following properties hold for     0.
1. At any score si > 0 where  i has no atom, developing (si, y⇤i (si)) with y⇤i (si) = F i(si) xi↵i
is strictly better than developing any other policy.
2. In any equilibrium, Fk (0) = 0 for some k 2 {L,R} and the support of the score CDFs
(Fi, F i) over s   0 is common, convex, atomless, and includes 0.
We now prove the remaining results in the main text using this result.
Proof of Proposition 1 Since the CDFs are atomless over (0,1) and at such scores
developing (si, y⇤i (si)) is strictly better than any other policy (by Lemma 1), in equilibrium
the probability a policy (si, yi) with si > 0 satisfies yi = y⇤i (si) is 1. Observation 1 then
follows: if Fi (0) = 0 then i’s policies are strictly positive score with probability 1, and if
Fi (0) > 0 then F i (0) = 0 (also by Lemma 1), policies with score si  0 both lose for sure
and never a↵ect a tie, and therefore must be 0 quality.
Also observe that the score conditions in Lemma 1 (combined with our technical restriction
on the score CDFs) immediately imply that (i) the score CDFs are absolutely continuous over
[0, s¯], where s¯ > 0 is the maximum score and may be =1, (ii) Fk (0) = 0 for some k 2 {L,R},
and (iii) lim
s!s¯
{Fi (s)} = 1 8i.
Now the proof proceeds in three steps. First we derive a pair of di↵erential equation on the
score CDF (Fi, F i) that must be satisfied. Next we prove that with symmetric entrepreneurs
the CDFs must be identical Fi = F i = F and derive a unique solution to the system. Finally
we prove that the resulting strategies yield an equilibrium.
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Step 1
Define the function ⇧⇤i (si;F ) over all scores si   0 to be equal to:
⇧⇤i (si;F ) =  ↵i
 
si + [y
⇤
i (si)]
2 +F i (si) ·Vi (si, y⇤i (si))+Z
si
1
Vi
 
s i, y⇤ i (s i)
 
dF i. (A.1)
This is an entrepreneur’s expected utility were she always to win at a score-tie (with her
opponent or the reservation policy) with the policies y⇤i (si) substituted in.
Let  ⇤ denote an equilibrium strategy profile, and U⇤i denote i’s equilibrium utility in
that profile. At an equilibrium profile there are no atoms above 0, so entrepreneur i’s utility
from developing the optimal policy at any score si > 0 is exactly equal to ⇧⇤i (si;F ). The
statement is not necessarily true at si = 0, but i can achieve utility arbitrarily close to
⇧⇤i (0;F ) by developing a score " above. Consequently U
⇤
i   ⇧⇤i (si;F ) for all si   0. In
addition, ⇧⇤i (si;F )   U⇤i and thus = U⇤i 8si 2 [0, s¯]; if instead for some si 2 [0, s¯] we had
U⇤i > ⇧
⇤
i (si;F ) then by continuity of (Fi, F i) over si > 0 (and right continuity at 0) i
would be developing scores with positive probability that yield strictly lower utility than her
equilibrium utility, a contradiction.
Finally, since (Fi, F i) are also absolutely continuous and strictly increasing 8s 2 [0, s¯] by
full support, U⇤i = ⇧
⇤
i (si;F ) 8si 2 [0, s¯] () @@si (⇧⇤i (si;F )) = 0 for almost all s 2 [0, s¯],
which yields the pair of di↵erential equations
↵i   F i (s) = f i (s) · 2xi
✓✓
xi
↵i
◆
F i (s) 
✓
x i
↵ i
◆
Fi (s)
◆
. (A.2)
Step 2
Substituting symmetric parameters (x,↵) into (A.2) yields
↵  F i (s) = f i (s) · 2x
2
↵
(FL (s) + FR (s)) for almost all s 2 [0, s¯] and i 2 {L,R} .
We first prove that a solution must be symmetric. The above implies fL(s)↵ FL(s) =
fR(s)
↵ FR(s) a.e.,
which then ! 9C s.t. lnC   ln (↵  FL (s)) =   ln (↵  FR (s)) a.e. and hence everywhere
(since the F ’s are continuous), which then ! ↵ FL(s)↵ FR(s) = C 8s 2 [0, s¯].
We now argue that FL (0) = FR (0), which ! C = 1 () FL (s) = FR (s) = F (s)
8s 2 [0, s¯]. Observe that lim
s!s¯
n
↵ FL(s)
↵ FR(s)
o
= 1 since lim
s!s¯
{Fi (s)} = 1 8i. But if there were
some k 2 {L,R} with Fk (0) > 0, then Lemma 1 requires that F k (0) = 0, implying that
↵ FL(s)
↵ FR(s) = C 6= 1 8s 2 [0, s¯], a contradiction. Hence, the entrepreneurs must use identical
score CDFs F (s) with F (0) = 0. The ideologies yi (s) = sign (xi) · x↵F (s) then follow from
Lemma 1. The rest of the derivation is contained in the main text; also observe the di↵erential
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equation on F 1(F ) satisfies a Lipschitz condition and so has a unique solution.
Step 3
The strategies derived (a unique common score CDF and policies equal to y⇤i (s) =
xi
↵ F (s)
with probability 1 since F (0) = 0) have been shown to be necessary for equilibrium. We
now show they are an equilibrium and hence the unique one. First, observe that all policies
(si, y⇤i (si)) s.t. si 2 (0, s¯] yield utility equal to a Uˆ⇤i that is strictly higher than the utility from
any other policy (si, yi) with si > 0, since by construction ⇧⇤i (si;F ) is constant over [0, s¯]
and strictly decreasing above (for si > s¯, ⇧⇤i (si;F )   ⇧⇤i (s¯;F ) =   (↵i   1) (si   s¯) < 0).
This is also i’s utility from playing her strategy. Second, at negative scores si  0, developing
a 0-quality policy (i.e. ideology yi = ±p si) is strictly better than developing any other
policy; F (0) = 0 implies neither entrepreneur ever ties with the reservation policy, so a
weakly negative score policy with positive quality both always loses and never influences a
tie. Finally, again since F (0) = 0 and is right continuous, negative-score 0-quality policies
(including the reservation policy) yield ⇧⇤i (0;F ) = Uˆ
⇤
i . All policies thus yield the same or
strictly less utility than Uˆ⇤i and we have an equilibrium. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 2 The CDF over ideological extremism G (y) = yx/↵ is decreasing in
x and increasing in ↵, showing the desired e↵ects of ideology and costs. For the remaining
CDFs we must work with their inverses. Observe that for a parameter p, F 1 (F (s; p) ; p) =
s ! @F@p =   @F
 1/@p
@F 1/@F ; so since a CDF and its inverse @F
 1/@F are increasing functions, a
CDF F (s; p) is first order stochastically increasing in p i.f.f. its inverse is increasing in p.
The inverse score CDF is F 1 (F ) = 4x2
 
ln
 
↵
↵ F
   F↵   which is clearly increasing in x and
decreasing in ↵, showing the desired comparative statics. Finally, the inverse quality CDF is
H 1 (H) = F 1 (H) +
 
H x↵
 2
; both components are increasing in x and decreasing in ↵. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 3 To see that an entrepreneur’s utility for her opponent’s equilibrium
policies is decreasing in their extremism when ↵   3, observe that i’s utility when her opponent
develops a policy of extremism y is Vi (s (y) , sign(xi)y) =  x2 + s (y)  2xy; di↵erentiating
yields s0 (y)   2x = 4xyx y   2x  0 i.f.f. y  x3 . Since ideological extremism is uniformly
distributed over
⇥
0, x↵
⇤
, the derivative is negative for all ideologies in the support i.f.f. ↵   3.
To show statements about the entrepreneurs’ equilibrium utility, observe it is equal to
 ↵  s¯+ (x/↵)2 + Vi (s¯, xi/↵) =   (1  1/↵) x2   (↵  1) s¯,
i.e., their utility from producing score s¯ with ideology xi↵ and winning for sure. From this it
immediately follows that each entrepreneur is strictly worse o↵ with competition than as a
monopolist, because her utility as a monopolist is  ↵ (x/↵)2 + Vi (0, xi/↵) =   (1  1/↵) x2
and s¯ > 0 in equilibrium.
Next, substituting in s¯ = F 1 (1) = 4x2
 
ln
 
↵
↵ 1
   1↵  and rearranging yields the en-
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trepreneurs’ equilibrium utility
 x2 (↵  1)
✓
4 ln
✓
↵
↵  1
◆
  3
↵
◆
To show the remaining desired properties we show that this function is strictly single-troughed
with minimum at ↵ˆ > 1, approaches 0 as ↵ approaches 1, is strictly less than  x2 (their utility
from the reservation policy) at ↵ˆ, and approaches  x2 as ↵!1. Thus, cost increases benefit
the entrepreneurs for ↵   ↵ˆ (and over this set they are strictly worse o↵ with competition
than just getting the reservation policy). In addition, there 9↵¯ 2 (1, ↵ˆ) s.t. their utility is
>  x2 for ↵ 2 (1, ↵¯).
Writing utility as x2f (↵) , where f (↵) = (↵  1)  4 ln   ↵↵ 1   3↵ , we see that lim↵!1+ f (↵) =
0 and lim↵!1 f (↵) = 1. Next, we show 9↵⇤ s.t. a) f (↵) is strictly concave below ↵⇤, b)
f (↵⇤) > 1, and c) f 0 (↵) < 0 for ↵   ↵⇤. These properties imply that f (↵) has a unique
maximum ↵ˆ 2 (1,↵⇤) and f (↵ˆ) > 1. Finally, the preceding observations imply that f (↵) = 1
at some ↵¯ < ↵ˆ, and that f (↵) < 1 for ↵ < ↵¯ and > 1 for ↵ > ↵¯.
Property a) can be shown by taking the second derivative f 00 (↵) and setting equal to 0;
the solution is ↵⇤ = 3. For property b) just evaluate at ↵⇤. Property c) can be shown by
rearranging the first derivative to be
1
↵2
✓
4↵2 ln
✓
↵
↵  1
◆
  (3 + 4↵)
◆
=
1
↵2
✓Z 1
0
4↵2
↵  qdq   2
Z 1
0
(3 + 4↵) q dq
◆
=
1
↵2
✓Z 1
0
 4↵2   6↵ + q (6 + 8↵)
↵  q dq
◆
.
The numerator is clearly < 0 8q 2 [0, 1] when ↵   ↵⇤ = 3. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 4 First note that our arguments about the form of equilibria do not
apply here since they are based on the assumption that xi, x i 6= 0. Now let ⇧i (si, yi) denote
i’s expected utility from developing policy (si, yi) (suppressing the dependence on the other
players’ strategies). Suppose xk = 0 and x k 6= 0; then Vk (s, y) = s. Since k has the same
utility as the DM she no longer cares about how score ties are broken, so it is simple to verify
that her utility from developing any policy (sk, yk) is equal to,
⇧k (0, 0)  ↵k
 
sk + y
2
k
 
+ F k (max {sk, 0}) · (sk   E [max {s k, 0} | s k  sk]) .
The above is = ⇧k (0, 0) for sk + y2k = 0 and < ⇧k (0, 0) otherwise. So regardless of  k’s
strategy, k’s 0 quality policies are all equivalent, and strictly dominate all other policies.
Now consider  k; if her opponent is developing only 0-quality (and thus  0 score policies)
then she can win for sure with score " and achieve utility arbitrarily close to her monopoly
utility from developing
⇣
0, x k↵ k
⌘
. It is also simple to verify that this utility is strictly higher
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than that from developing any other policy. Thus, if the DM picks
⇣
0, x k↵ k
⌘
with probability
< 1 when developed,  k’s best-response correspondence is empty. Conversely, any strategy
profile in which k mixes over 0-quality policies,  k develops
⇣
0, x k↵ k
⌘
, and the DM chooses
it with probability 1 is an equilibrium. (Note that unlike the baseline model, equilibrium in
this variant requires specifying the DM’s tie-breaking rule.) ⌅
Proof of Proposition 5 Begin with the two-player symmetric equilibrium. Observe that
there are no atoms, and both entrepreneurs develop strictly positive-score policies with prob-
ability 1. Developing any 0-quality policy is therefore exactly equivalent, and strictly better
than developing a weakly negative score policy with positive quality. We henceforth refer to
developing a 0-quality policy as being “inactive” and a strictly positive-score policy as being
“active.” Also observe that since F (0) = 0, both entrepreneurs are active with probability 1,
and would achieve their equilibrium utility by being inactive.
Now consider the game with N additional weakly more moderate and less skilled en-
trepreneurs, and the strategy profile in which the original two entrepreneurs keep their strate-
gies from the two-player symmetric equilibrium, and the additional entrepreneurs are inactive.
First observe that the payo↵s to the two active entrepreneurs from developing any policy are
unchanged from the original game (in theory the behavior of the additional inactive en-
trepreneurs could be used to break ties between the active entrepreneurs or the reservation
policy, but with symmetric active entrepreneurs such ties never occur). Thus, the active
entrepreneurs have no profitable deviation.
To see that the inactive entrepreneurs also have no profitable deviation, first observe that
the net gain to an active entrepreneur i from producing (si   0, yi) above inactivity is
 ↵  si + y2i  + F (si) · ((si   E [s i | s i  si]) + 2x (yi + E [y (s i) | s i  si])) , (A.3)
where s i denotes the score of the other active entrepreneur. Because the active entrepreneurs’
strategies are an equilibrium absent the other players, the maximum over all (si   0, yi) is
0. To compute the net gain to an inactive entrepreneur j from producing (sj   0, yj) above
inactivity, first observe that the expected ideological outcome conditional on both active
entrepreneurs producing scores  sj is 0 by symmetry. Second, let smax denote the maximum
score policy developed; the probability that smax is  sj is [F (sj)]2 where F (·) is the score
CDF of the active entrepreneurs. Finally, E [s i | s i  sj]  E [smax | smax  sj]. Combining,
the net gain to an inactive entrepreneur j from deviating to a policy (sj   0, yj) is
 ↵j
 
sj + y
2
j
 
+ [F (sj)]
2 · ((sj   E [smax | smax  sj]) + 2xjyj) (A.4)
By the previous observations, Equation A.3 is   than Equation A.4 8 (sj   0, yj) when ↵j   ↵
and |xj|  x; so the maximum net gain from deviating to activity for an inactive entrepreneur
is  0, and we have an equilibrium. ⌅
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Proof of Proposition 6 Before beginning the main proof we prove an accessory lemma.
Lemma A.1. Consider a continuous function h (x) that is almost-everywhere di↵erentiable,
and let hi (x) denote the i’th derivative of h (with h0 (x) = h (x)). Then the following two
conditions imply that h (x) is increasing in x   0.
1. hk (0) = 0 8 integer k 2 [0, i], and hi+1 (0) > 0
2. h (x) > 0! h0 (x) > 0 wherever h is di↵erentiable
Proof. We first argue that property (1) implies h (x) > 0 in a neighborhood above 0.
First observe that sign {h (x)} = sign
n
h(x)
xi+1
o
for x > 0. Next, repeated applications of
L’Hopital’s rule imply that limx!0
n
h(x)
xi+1
o
= h
i+1(0)
(i+1)! > 0, which then implies h (x) > 0 in
a neighborhood above 0. Next, when the preceding holds then by property 2 h (x) is also
strictly increasing in that neighborhood almost everywhere; it therefore must remain positive
and strictly increasing thereafter. ⌅
The proof now proceeds in two steps. In Step 1 we derive the unique symmetric equilib-
rium, and in Step 2 we show it has the desired properties.
Step 1
Beginning with the necessary conditions in Lemma 1, the proof proceeds identically as the
proof of Proposition 1 through the end of Step 1, yielding a modified di↵erential equation
↵i F i (s) = f i (s) ·2xi
 ✓
xi
↵i
◆
F i (s) 
✓
x i
↵ i
◆
Fi (s) +  
 
s+
✓
x i
↵ i
Fi (s)
◆2!!
. (A.5)
that must be satisfied a.e. in the support [0, s¯] and generates a constant ⇧⇤i (si;F ) for s 2 [0, s¯].
Relative to Equation A.2, losing now entails an additional cost of  
✓
s+
⇣
x i
↵ iFi (s)
⌘2◆
, which
is the share of an opponent’s quality that isn’t valued.
In the baseline model we proved that the equilibrium with symmetric parameters is unique
and symmetric; for this variant we make the weaker assertion that there is a unique symmet-
ric equilibrium, but do not rule out other asymmetric equilibria. Substituting the symmet-
ric parameters and common score CDF F (s) yields the di↵erential equation ↵   F (s) =
f (s)
⇣
4x
2
↵ F (s) +  
⇣
s+
 
x
↵F (s)
 2⌘⌘
. For notational simplicity we will henceforth use s (F )
to denote the inverse F 1 (F ), and again as in the argument for Proposition 1 we may derive
a simpler di↵erential equation for the inverse s (F ),
s0 (F ) =
4x
2
↵ F +  
⇣
s (F ) +
 
x
↵F
 2⌘
↵  F . (A.6)
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The di↵erential equation satisfies a Lipschitz condition and thus has a unique solution with
the boundary condition s (0) = 0 which is necessary. It can be verified that this solution is:
s (F ; x,↵,  ) = x2
0@(8 + 6 ) ·
⇣ 
↵
↵ F
     1   ↵F⌘  (1 +  )   F↵  2
  (1 +  ) (2 +  )
1A
and yields a well defined s¯ = s (1) <1 8  > 0. Finally, the argument that these strategies
are indeed an equilibrium is the same as in step 3 in the proof of Proposition 1. The fact that
the distribution of ideologies is identical to the baseline model follows directly from Lemma
1, using the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium y⇤i (si) = F i(si)
xi
ai
and F (0) = 0.
Step 2
We show that s (F ; x,↵,  ) is increasing in F , and 8F 2 (0, 1] is increasing in x and  ,
decreasing in ↵, and satisfies increasing di↵erences in (x,  ). By the arguments in the proof of
Proposition 2 this su ces to show the desired first-order stochastic changes in both the score
and quality CDFs from (x,  ,↵). It also su ces to show that the cross partial in (x,  ) of the
DM’s equilibrium utility is positive, since (from footnote 4) the DM’s equilibrium utility isR 1
0 2F · s (F ; x,↵,  ) dF , and the cross partial in (x,  ) is
R 1
0 2F · @
2(s(F ;x,↵, ))
@x@  dF > 0.
Despite a closed form solution, it is nevertheless easier to derive comparative statics
directly from the di↵erential equation in (A.6). It will also be helpful to have the first,
second, and third derivatives of s (F ) evaluated 0; repeated di↵erentiation of (A.6) and
employing the boundary condition s (0) = 0 yields that s0 (0) = 0, s00 (0) = 4 x
2
↵2 , and
s000 (0) =
⇣
2x2
↵3
⌘
· (3  + 4).
We now show the desired properties of s (F ; x,↵,  ) by repeatedly employing Lemma A.1.
• To see s (F ) increasing in F , observe that property 1 follows immediately from the
derivatives evaluated at 0, and property 2 is easily verified from Equation A.6.
• To see s (F ; x) increasing in x for F > 0, we show that s (F ; xˆ)   s (F ; x) is > 0
8xˆ > x and F > 0 (it is equal to 0 for F = 0 and any values of x, xˆ). To do this,
we show the stronger property that s (F ; xˆ)   s (F ; x) is increasing in F by showing it
satisfies properties 1 and 2 of Lemma A.1. Di↵erentiating using Equation A.6 yields
s0 (F ; xˆ)   s0 (F ; x) = 1↵ F ·
⇣⇣
4F
↵ +  
F 2
↵2
⌘
(xˆ2   x2) +   (s (F ; xˆ)  s (F ; x))
⌘
, which is
positive when s (F ; xˆ) s (F ; x) > 0 and therefore satisfies property 2. Property 1 follows
from observing (using the previously derived derivatives) that the first derivative of the
di↵erence at F = 0 is 0 and the second derivative is 4↵2 (xˆ
2   x2) > 0.
• For identical reasons we show s(F ;  ˆ) s (F ;  ) satisfies properties 1 and 2 for  ˆ >     0.
Di↵erentiating using Equation A.6 yields s0(F ;  ˆ) s0 (F ;  ) = ( ˆ  )(
x
↵F)
2
+( ˆs(F ; ˆ)  s(F ; ))
↵ F .
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To see the function satisfies property 2 observe that  ˆs(F ;  ˆ)  s (F ;  ) >  ˆ
⇣
s
⇣
F ;  ˆ
⌘
  s (F ;  )
⌘
.
To see it satisfies property 1 observe that the first and second derivatives at 0 are 0,
and the third derivative is
⇣
6x2
↵3
⌘
·
⇣
 ˆ    
⌘
> 0.
• We show s (F ;↵)   s (F ; ↵ˆ) satisfies properties 1 and 2 for 1  ↵ < ↵ˆ. The function
satisfies property 2 since s0 (F ;↵) is increasing in s (F ;↵) and decreasing in ↵ (holding
s (F ;↵) fixed), so s (F ; x,↵) > s (F ; x, ↵ˆ) ! s0 (F ; x,↵) > s0 (F ; x, ↵ˆ). It also satisfies
property 1 since s00 (0;↵)  s00 (0; ↵ˆ) = 4x2
⇣
↵ˆ2 ↵2
↵2↵ˆ2
⌘
> 0.
• We show that (s(F ; xˆ,  ˆ)   s(F ; x,  ˆ))   (s (F ; xˆ,  )  s (F ; x,  )) satisfies properties 1
and 2 for xˆ > x and  ˆ >     0. Di↵erentiating using Equation A.6 yields,
1
↵  F
✓
 ˆ
⇣
s
⇣
F ; xˆ,  ˆ
⌘
  s
⇣
F ; x,  ˆ
⌘⌘
    (s (F ; xˆ,  )  s (F ; x,  )) + ( ˆ    )F
2 (xˆ2   x2)
↵2
◆
.
This is >  ˆ↵ F
⇣⇣
s
⇣
F ; xˆ,  ˆ
⌘
  s
⇣
F ; x,  ˆ
⌘⌘
  (s (F ; xˆ,  )  s (F ; x,  ))
⌘
so the function
satisfies property 2. It also satisfies property 1 since first and second derivatives at 0
are 0, but the third derivative is
 
6
↵3
  · (xˆ2   x2) · ⇣ ˆ    ⌘ > 0. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 7 Suppose we are at an equilibrium strategy profile satisfying Lemma
1 and nobody engages in sabotage. Consider a deviation by i to a profile (si, yi, qsi ) with
sabotage qsi > 0. Then the probability that  i’s policy yields utility  s is F i (s+ qsi ). Since
by Lemma 1 neither entrepreneur has an atom above 0 in equilibrium, with some sabotage
an opponent’s policy never ties with the reservation policy. So all the negative score 0 quality
policies si < 0, yi = ±p si are strictly better than the positive quality ones, and yield the
same utility as the reservation policy with sabotage (0, 0, qsi ). In addition, winning outright
when s i  si + qsi and si = 0 is at least as good as tying with the reservation policy (since a
tie generates a mixture between i’s policy and the reservation policy). We therefore restrict
attention to deviations with qsi > 0 and si > 0.
Now i’s utility if she develops such a policy is,
 ↵i
 
si + y
2
i
  ↵si qsi+F i (si + qsi )Vi (si, yi)+ Z
s i>si+qsi
 
Vi (s i, y i)   
 
s i + y2 i
   (1   ) qsi   d  i.
If instead she reallocated her sabotage to productive e↵ort (si + qsi , yi, 0) then it is easy to
verify that her net gain is weakly positive i.f.f.
F i (si + qsi ) · qsi + (1  F i (si + qsi )) · (1   ) qsi   (↵i   ↵si ) qsi .
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The inequality is most di cult to satisfy if F i (si + qsi ) = 0 (since 1      1), and holds
in this case () ↵si   ↵i   (1   ). Thus, if this condition holds then some strategy
without sabotage is at least as good as any strategy with sabotage, and the no sabotage
equilibrium holds. Conversely, if this condition fails then the inequality fails for F i (si + qsi )
su ciently small. Since by Lemma 1 F i (0) = 0 for some i in any equilibrium, there 9qsi and
si su ciently small s.t. every policy (si + qsi , yi, 0) with only productive e↵ort (including the
one in i’s support) is strictly worse than the policy (si, yi, qsi ) with sabotage; hence she has a
profitable deviation and no sabotage is not an equilibrium. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 8 In this variant, the definition of a score and the DM’s best re-
sponses remain unchanged. With the entrepreneurs’ modified utility function, i0s utility for
a policy (s, y) being implemented is Vi (s, y) = (s+ y2) + 1y=xi · B |xi|. Observe that the
entrepreneurs have dogmatic preferences over ideology, but nevertheless still value quality on
their opponent’s policy; the model therefore still has rank-order spillovers. We make this
assumption to preserve comparability to the main model (although it stands to reason that a
dogmatic entrepreneur would also discount her opponent’s quality).
In Appendix C we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Developing a policy (si,yi) with si > 0 and either (i) yi 6= xi, or (ii) yi = xi
and F i (si)  ↵i|xi||xi|+B , is strictly worse than developing (0,0). In addition, the support of the
equilibrium score CDFs over s   0 is common, convex, atomless above 0, and includes 0.
Since the CDFs are atomless over (0,1) and at such scores developing (si, xi) is strictly
better than any other policy, in equilibrium (i) the probability a policy (si, yi) with si > 0
satisfies yi = xi is 1, (ii) the CDFs are absolutely continuous over [0, s¯] with s¯ > 0 and satisfy
lim
s!s¯
{Fi (s)} = 1 8i. The proof now proceeds in two steps. First, we derive an equilibrium and
show it must yield utility at least as high as any other equilibrium. Second, we prove that the
decisionmaker’s utility in the equilibrium described satisfies the conditions of Proposition 8.
Step 1
First we argue that in any equilibrium the entrepreneurs use a common score CDF
F i (s) = Fi (s) = F (s) for s   0. Since the CDFs have common convex support, either
Fi (0) = 1 8i (in which case the properties hold trivially), or Fi (0) < 1 8i. As in the proof of
Proposition 1 define ⇧⇤i (si;F ) over all scores si   0 as:
⇧⇤i (si;F ) =  ↵i
 
si + x
2
i
 
+ F i (si) ·
 
si + x
2
i +B |xi|
 
+
Z
si
1  
s i + x2 i
 
dF i, (A.7)
and by identical arguments ⇧⇤i (si;F ) = U
⇤
i 8si 2 [0, s¯]. Substituting in the symmetric
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parameters and di↵erentiating, this condition holds i.f.f. for almost all s 2 [0, s¯] ,
↵  F i (s) = f i (s) · Bx 8i. (A.8)
The above implies that ci   ln (↵  Fi (s)) = sBx 8s 2 [0, s¯] with s¯ < 1; since Fi (s¯) =
F i (s¯) = 1 we have ci = c i and Fi (s) = F (s) 8s 2 [0, s¯], i.e., a common score CDF over
this range. Inserting the starting value F (0) yields ln
⇣
↵ F (0)
↵ F (s)
⌘
= sBx in any equilibrium. In
addition, F (0)   min  ↵xx+B , 1 ; if instead F (0) < ↵xx+B then s¯ > 0 and by Lemma 2 both
entrepreneurs are developing policies with scores close to 0 that yield strictly less utility than
developing the reservation policy, a contradiction.
Second we argue that for distinct equilibria yielding score CDFs
⇣
F, Fˆ
⌘
, the DM’s utility
is strictly greater in the former i.f.f. F (0) < Fˆ (0). In any equilibrium ln
⇣
↵ F (0)
↵ F (s)
⌘
= sBx
8s 2 [0, s¯]; so if there are two distinct equilibrium score CDFs
⇣
F, Fˆ
⌘
with F (0) < Fˆ (0)
then it is easily verified that Fˆ (s)   F (s) 8s > 0 with positive measure strict; so the DM’s
utility
R
s 0
@
@s
 
[F (s)]2
 
ds is strictly higher with F than Fˆ (and equal if F (0) = Fˆ (0)).
Finally we assert that the following symmetric strategies are an equilibrium (i) each en-
trepreneur develops either (0, 0) or (s, xi) with s > 0, (ii) each entrepreneur uses the CDF
F (s) = 0 for s < 0, F (s) solving ln
⇣
↵  ↵xx+B
↵ F (s)
⌘
= sBx for s 2
h
0, Bx ln
⇣
↵  ↵xx+B
↵ 1
⌘i
, and F (s) = 1
above. Using similar arguments to those in step 3 of the proof of Proposition 1, it is easily
established that (i) all policies (si, xi) s.t. si 2 (0, s¯] yield utility equal to some value Uˆ⇤i
that is strictly higher than the utility from any other policy (si, yi) with si > 0, and (ii) at
strictly negative scores si < 0 developing a 0-quality policy (i.e. ideology yi = ±p si) is
strictly better than developing any other policy, and yields the same utility as developing the
reservation policy.16 It is also easy to verify that developing the reservation policy yields Uˆ⇤i ;
thus both entrepreneurs get Uˆ⇤i by playing their strategies.
It remains only to show that developing (0, yi) with yi 6= 0 is not a profitable deviation.
Since  i develops (0,0) at 0, the utility from actually developing (0, yi) is weakly worse
than the utility from developing it and always winning when s i  0, which in turn is
 ⇧⇤i (0;F ) = U⇤i . All policies thus yield the same or strictly less utility than Uˆ⇤i and we have
an equilibrium; since F (0) = ↵x↵+B , its lowest possible value, the DM’s utility is at least as
high as in any other equilibrium.
Step 2
We now show the decisionmaker’s utility in the equilibrium characterized satisfies Prop.
8. If ↵xx+B   1 then F (0) = 1 and the decisionmaker’s equilibrium utility is 0. If ↵xx+B < 1
16The proof of Proposition 1 relies on Fi (0) = 0 8i; here we have “ties” at the 0-score but they are
inconsequential because both entrepreneurs develop the reservation policy at this score.
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then since the DM’s utility U (x) is
R 1
F (0)
@
@F (F
2)F 1 (F ) · dF we have
U (x) = 2Bx ·
Z 1
↵x
x+B
F ln
✓
↵  ↵xx+B
↵  F
◆
dF .
Clearly this is equal to 0 at x = 0 and B↵ 1 , and positive in between. We now show that this
expression is strictly quasi-concave (single peaked) in between, by showing that (i) U 0 (0) > 0,
(ii) U 0
 
B
↵ 1
 
= 0, and (iii) 9x⇤ 2  0, B↵ 1  s.t. U 00 (x) < (=)(>)0 () x < (=) (>) x⇤. Then
(iii) implies that U 0 is strictly single troughed and minimized at x⇤ 2  0, B↵ 1 , (ii) implies
that U 0 (x⇤) < 0, and (i) implies that 9xˆ 2 (0, x⇤) with U 0 > 0 for x 2 (0, xˆ) and < 0 for
x 2  xˆ, B↵ 1 , yielding strict single peakedness. The first derivative is
2B
 Z 1
↵x
x+B
F ln
✓
↵  ↵xx+B
↵  F
◆
dF  
✓
1  ↵x
x+B
◆
·
✓
x
x+B
◆!
and it is easily verified that this satisfies (i) and (ii). The second derivative is,
2B
✓
x
(B   (↵  1) x) + ↵B
(x+B)3
  2
✓
1  ↵x
x+B
◆
·
✓
1
x+B
◆◆
,
which is > (=) (<) 0 i.f.f. ↵Bxx+2B > (=) (<)B   (↵  1) x. The l.h.s. is strictly increasing in
x, the r.h.s. is strictly decreasing in x, and it is easily verified that l.h.s.<r.h.s. when x = 0
and l.h.s.>r.h.s. when x = B↵ 1 . ⌅
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B Complete Treatment of Baseline Model
We prove Lemma 1 as a sequence of four lemmas. From the main text, an entrepreneur’s utility
for her own policy is Vi (si, yi), while for her opponent’s policy is Vi (s i, y i)   
 
s i + y2 i
 
(since she discounts its quality if     0). Let ⇧i (si, yi;   i) denote i’s expected utility from
developing policy (si, yi) (suppressing the dependence on the DM’s tie-breaking rules). At
any score si > 0 where  i has no atom, this expected utility is equal to
 ↵i
 
si + y
2
i
 
+ F i (si) · Vi (si, yi) +
Z
s i>si
 
Vi (s i, y i)   
 
s i + y2 i
  
d  i. (B.1)
Taking the first order condition with respect to yi yields the following.
Lemma B.1. At any score si > 0 where  i has no atom, developing (si, y⇤i (si)) with y⇤i (si) =
F i(si) · xiai is strictly better than developing any other policy.
Next we show that in equilibrium there is 0 probability of a tie at a strictly positive score.
Lemma B.2. In equilibrium there is 0-probability of a tie at scores s > 0.
Proof: Suppose not, i.e., each player’s strategy generates an atom of size pi at some
common s > 0. Let y¯t denote the expected ideological outcome conditional on the tie at
score s (which depends on both players’ strategies and the decisionmaker’s tiebreaking rule).
Let F  i (si) = lim
s!s i
{F i (s)}, and let wi (yi, y i; s) denote the probability the DM chooses i’s
policy when the entrepreneurs develop (s, yi) and (s, y i).
Entrepreneur k’s utility from playing according to her strategy conditional on a tie (which
may involve mixing over ideologies) is
 ↵kV ar [yk | s]  ↵k
 
s+ (E [yk | s])2
 
+ F  k (s) · Vk (s, E [yk | s])
+p k ·
0@Vk (s, y¯t)    Z
sk=s
Z
s k=s
w k (yk, y k; s) ·
 
s k + y2 k
  d k
pk
d  k
p k
1A
+
Z
s k>s
 
Vk (s k, y k)   
 
s k + y2 k
  
d  k
Since the entrepreneurs want to move ideology in strictly opposite directions conditional on
a score, Vk (s, 0)   Vk (s, y¯t) for at least one k. In addition, tying also involves a potential
quality discount cost when  k’s policy wins. Rearranging, k’s utility from playing according
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to her strategy conditional on a tie (which may involve mixing over ideologies), is 
 ↵k
 
s+ E
⇥
y2k | s
⇤ 
+ F  k (s) · Vk (s, E [yk | s])
+p k · Vk (s, 0) +
Z
s k>s
 
Vk (s k, y k)   
 
s k + y2 k
  
d  k.
Now let y = lim
sk!s 
{y⇤k (sk)}; by definition E [yk | s] = y with zero variance maximizes the first
line. Moreover since y is weakly better than 0 for k, the above is  limsk!s+
 
⇧k
 
sk, y;   k
  
;
but this in turn is strictly < limsk!s+ {⇧k (sk, y⇤k (s) ;   k)} (because p k > 0 implies y 6=
lim
sk!s+
{y⇤k (sk)}, so tying must be strictly worse than just winning with (s, y⇤k (s)). ⌅
Having ruled out ties at strictly positive scores, we now show one of the entrepreneurs k
must always be active, in the sense of developing a policy strictly better for the decisionmaker
than the reservation policy (Fk (0) = 0 for some k). An immediate implication is that the
decisionmaker is strictly better o↵ with competition with probability 1.
Lemma B.3. In equilibrium Fk (0) = 0 for some k 2 {L,R}.
Proof: Denote entrepreneur i’s equilibrium utility as U⇤i , and suppose not, i.e., Fi (0) > 0
8i; this could be due to atoms at 0, developing scores lower than 0, or both. Let y¯t denote the
expected ideological outcome conditional on both players developing scores  0, which could
be a complicated function of the players’ strategies and the decisionmaker’s tie-breaking rule.
We will show equilibrium implies y¯t = 0, implying both entrepreneurs have a strict incentive
to produce score " and win with strictly positive probability bounded away from 0.
Entrepreneur i can achieve U⇤i by mixing according to her strategy conditional on gener-
ating score  0, and utility arbitrarily close to limsi!0+ {⇧i (si, 0;   i)} by developing a policy
with " score and ideology at 0. Equilibrium thus requires that U⇤i   limsi!0+ {⇧i (si, 0;   i)}  
0. But also observe that
U⇤i   lim
si!0+
{⇧i (si, 0;   i)}   ↵i
Z
si0
 
si + y
2
i
  d i
Fi (0)
+ F i (0) · (Vi (0, y¯t)  Vi (0, 0))
(and the l.h.s. = r.h.s. when   = 0). Equilibrium thus requires that the r.h.s. be   0 for
both entrepreneurs {i, i}. But this then implies that both y¯t   0 and y¯t  0, so y¯t = 0
and U⇤i = limsi!0+ {⇧i (si, 0;   i)}. But then by Lemma B.1 limsi!0+ {⇧i (si, y⇤i (0) ;   i)} is
strictly higher for both entrepreneurs since y⇤i (0) = F i (0) · xi↵i 6= 0, and they each have a
strict incentive to deviate to an "-higher score and produce their optimal ideology. ⌅
Note that the decisionmaker’s access to the reservation policy is irrelevant for the proof; in
the competitive model what matters about the reservation policy is that it is “free” to develop.
This contrasts with the monopoly model, where the policy that the DM can unilaterally
implement matters crucially, because the monopolist behaves as an agenda setter.
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Last, we show additional natural properties of the equilibrium score CDFs.
Lemma B.4. The support of the equilibrium score CDFs over s   0 is common, convex, and
includes 0. In addition, both CDFs are atomless 8s > 0.
Proof: We first show that if sˆ > 0 is in the support of Fi then F i (sˆ)   F i (sˆ  ") > 0
8" > 0. Suppose not; then 9" > 0 such that F i (s) is constant over [sˆ  ", sˆ] and  i has no
atom at sˆ " or sˆ. Intuitively, this can’t happen because i would be playing scores above sˆ "
without getting a higher probability of victory. Formally ⇧i (sˆ, yi;   i)  ⇧i (sˆ  ", yi;   i) =
  (↵i   F i (sˆ)) · " < 0 8yi, implying by an envelope argument that i’s utility from developing
(sˆ  ", y⇤ (sˆ  ")) is strictly higher than developing (sˆ, y⇤ (sˆ)); if sˆ were in the support she
could do strictly better by deviating to (sˆ  ", y⇤ (sˆ  ")), a contradiction.
Now the preceding argument implies several of the desired properties. If the players’ score
CDFs did not have common support over s > 0, then one player would have support at a
score where the other player’s CDF is constant below, violating the condition. If the common
support did not include 0 or were not convex, then there would exist a score s00 > 0 in the
common support and a strictly lower score s0   0 such that Fi (s) was constant 8i over [s0, s00),
at least one k had Fk (s00) = Fk (s0) (since both cannot have atoms at s00 by Lemma B.2), and
the condition would again be violated.
Finally we show that no entrepreneur has an atom above 0 by contradiction. Suppose  i
has an atom at sˆ > 0 of size p i; then i does not (by Lemma B.2) which implies E [y i | sˆ] =
y⇤ i (sˆ) (by Lemma B.1). By the argument in the preceding paragraph, i’s support includes
[0, sˆ], which implies Fi (sˆ) > 0 and y⇤ i (sˆ) 6= 0. In addition, limsi!sˆ  {⇧i (si, y⇤i (si) ;   i)}  
U⇤i (since otherwise i would be putting positive probability on scores yielding strictly less
utility than her equilibrium utility). Now let yˆi = limsi!sˆ  {y⇤i (si)} 6= 0, i.e., i’s optimal
ideology if she developed score sˆ and expected to always lose a tie. It is easily verified that
lim
si!sˆ+
{⇧i (si, yˆi;   i)}  lim
si!sˆ 
{⇧i (si, y⇤i (si) ;   i)}
= p i
⇣
Vi (sˆ, yˆi)  Vi
 
sˆ, y⇤ i (sˆ)
 
+  
⇣
sˆ+
 
y⇤ i (sˆ)
 2⌘⌘
> 0,
meaning it would yield utility strictly higher than i’s equilibrium utility to develop ideology
yˆi and score just above sˆ to win for sure, which is a contradiction. ⌅
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C Complete Treatment of Variant with Dogmatists
We prove Lemma 2 via two lemmas. Using previous notation, ⇧i (si, yi;   i) for any si > 0 is
 ↵i
 
si + y
2
i
 
+ F  i (si) · Vi (si, yi) +
Z
s i>si
Vi (s i, y i) d  i.
+
Z
s i=si
(wi (yi, y i; si) · Vi (si, yi) + w i (yi, y i; si) · Vi (si, y i)) d  i (C.1)
With some manipulation this may be rewritten as,
⇧i (0, 0;   i)  (↵i   F i (si)) si   (↵i   F i (si)) y2i + F i (si)B |xi| · 1yi=xi
 
Z
s i=si
(w i (yi, y i; si) · Vi (si, yi)) d  i  
Z
s i=si
(wi (yi, y i; si) · Vi (si, y i)) d  i
 
Z
s i=0
w i (0, y i; 0) · Vi (0, y i) d  i  
Z
s i2(0,si)
Vi (s i, y i) d  i. (C.2)
This is i’s utility ⇧i (0, 0;   i) from developing the reservation policy, plus a sequence of terms.
The remaining terms in the first line are i’s policy utility (net of costs) if she were to always
win when s i  si. The negative terms in the second line arise from the fact that  i may
have an atom at si; the first term captures the fact that i sometimes loses to  i when they tie
at s i = si and thus doesn’t get Vi (si, yi), while the second term nets o↵ the foregone utility
from sometimes defeating  i0s policies with score s i = si. The third line nets o↵ the foregone
policy utility from defeating  i’s policies with score s i 2 [0, si); since Vi (s, y) > 0 8s > 0
or s = 0, y 6= 0, the second and third lines are weakly negative. It is then straightforward to
show the following.
Lemma C.1. Developing a policy (si,yi) with si > 0 and either (i) yi 6= xi, or (ii) yi = xi
and F i (si)  ↵i|xi||xi|+B , is strictly worse than developing the reservation policy.
Proof: For si > 0, it is easy to verify from Equation C.2 that   (↵i   F i (si)) · y2i +
F i (si)B |xi| · 1yi=xi  0 ! ⇧i (si, yi;   i) < ⇧i (0, 0;   i); this is exactly the case when
yi 6= xi or yi = xi and F i (si)  ↵i|xi||xi|+B . ⌅
Using this, we prove the remaining parts of Lemma 2.
Lemma C.2. The support of the equilibrium score CDFs over s   0 is common, convex, and
includes 0. In addition, both CDFs are atomless 8s > 0.
Proof: We first rule out ties at scores s > 0. Suppose not so that both entrepreneurs
have an atom at s > 0 in equilibrium; by Lemma C.1 they must be developing (s, xi) and
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(s, x i), so limsi!s+ {⇧i (si, xi;   i)}   ⇧i (si, xi;   i) = p i (s) · B |xi| · w i (xi, x i; s) (where
pi (s) denotes the size of i’s atom at s). Since wi + w i = 1 this is > 0 for at least one
entrepreneur k, who has a strict incentive to deviate and produce "-higher score.
Next, it is simple to verify using identical arguments as in the proof of Lemma B.4 that
sˆ > 0 in support of Fi ! F i (sˆ)   F i (sˆ  ") > 0 8" > 0, which then implies support over
s   0 is common, convex, and includes 0. Last we rule out atoms above 0 by contradiction.
Suppose  i has an atom at sˆ > 0 of size p i (sˆ); by Lemma C.1 she develops (sˆ, x i). By
preceding arguments i’s support includes [0, sˆ] so limsi!sˆ  {⇧i (si, xi;   i)}   U⇤i , but
lim
si!sˆ+
{⇧i (si, xi;   i)}  lim
si!sˆ 
{⇧i (si, xi;   i)} = p i (sˆ) · B |xi| > 0,
so i can do strictly better than her equilibrium utility by developing (si + ", xi) for su ciently
small ", a contradiction. ⌅
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